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ABSTRACT
Investors usually resort to financial advisors to improve their investment process until the point of
complete delegation on investment decisions. Surely, financial advice is potentially a correcting
factor in investment decisions but, in the past, the media and regulators blamed biased advisors for
manipulating the expectations of naive investors. In order to give an analytic formulation of the
problem, we present an Agent-Based Model formed by individual investors and a financial advisor.
We parametrize the games by considering a compromise for the financial advisor (between a suffi-
cient reward by bank and to keep his/her reputation), and a compromise for the customers (between
the desired return and the proposed return by advisor). Then we obtain the Nash equilibria and the
best response functions of the resulting game. We also describe the parameter regions in which these
points result acceptable equilibria and the greediness/naivety of the customers emerge naturally from
the model. Finally, we focus on the efficiency of the best Nash equilibrium.
Keywords Opinion dynamics · Agents-based model · Personal finance · Price of Stability
1 Introduction
Decisions concerning personal finance are taken by individuals on the basis of a variety of factors. For example,
the investment decision process appears to incorporate a broad range of variables that may influence the individual
investor’s behaviour, such as the perceived ethics of a firm, and recommendations from individual stock brokers or
friends/coworkers [1]. Actually, investors usually resort to financial advisors to improve their investment process until
the point of complete delegation on investment decisions. Surely, financial advice is potentially a correcting factor in
investment decisions [2].
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the recent financial bubbles, the media and the regulators usually placed much of
the blame on biased advisors for manipulating the expectations of naive investors [3]. According to this view, an
analyst may receive incentives to generate biased, optimistic forecasts while naive individual investors are unable to
recognize that these biased recommendations are motivated by incentives to sell financial products. This means that,
when asked for a professional advice (i.e. an opinion), advisors may not straightforwardly state what they truly think,
but rather be tempted to misrepresent their opinion to conform to the bank they are paid by. In any case, the role of
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financial advisors, as well as that of other influencers, is to be properly accounted for in an analysis of personal finance
decisions.
However, though the decisions taken in personal finance have been a subject of interest in a number of papers (see, e.g.,
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8]), so far the adopted framework has considered an individual acting without interaction with influencers
of any kind.
In this paper, we wish instead to consider such interactions, with the aim of understanding how the opinions of
an individual investor may change under the influence of his/her advisors, considering the aims of the stakeholders
involved. For this purpose we formulate an Agent-Based Model (ABM) that includes three classes of agents: a bank,
a financial advisor, a set of investors or customers. This model mimics the environment an individual investor finds
when it manageshis/her investment through the local branch of a bank, where a financial advisor oversees a group of
the bank’s customers. The different aims of the stakeholders are recognized by resorting to a game-theoretic model,
where each personal investment/advise corresponds to selecting a strategy, and the agents’ payoff depends on the
strategies chosen by him/herself and other players. We refer to this game as the personal finance game and provide
the following contributions:
• We introduce an ABM to address the personal finance game (Section 3). The major advantage that we expect
from the adoption of an analytic framework like ABM is that analytic derivations of the properties of the
model can be equally used as descriptive and as prescriptive tools, as widely noticed in the literature (e.g. [9],
and also [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]).
• We obtain the best response functions and the Nash equilibria of the resulting game (Section 4.1). We also
describe the parameter regions in which these points represent acceptable equilibria (Section 4.1.1). Surpris-
ingly, without constraints on the returns (except for the fact that the proposed returns by advisor differ from
the one desired by customers), the equilibrium is reached when the customer expects a return bigger than the
one the advisor proposes instead.
• We provide a mathematical description of the boundary of the utility functions domain D (Section 4.2).
• We introduce the social welfare in this context and obtain an analytic formulation of the Price of Stability (the
generalization of the Price of Anarchy when more equilibria are present) for our ABM (Section 5) thanks to
the analytic formulation of D (given in the previous point).
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to the literature framework of opinion formation games that relax the assumption of truthfulness
(a.k.a as honesty) in the process of opinion formation, allowing game players to express some opinions which need
not coincide with their true opinions.
The players whose opinions we wish to model are represented as nodes of a social network (i.e., vertices on a graph),
where the links between the nodes represent the direct influence between players in forming their opinions.
We therefore introduce a connected undirected graphG = (V , E) be with |V| = n and for each edge e = (i, j) ∈ E let
wij ≥ 0 be its weight. LetW = [wij ]ij be the matrix of weights. Every vertex of the graph (i.e., each player or agent)
is characterized by an internal opinion si and a stated opinion zi. The set of neighbors of agent i in the social network
represented by the graphG is denoted by N(i).
This game can be expressed as an instance (G,W, s, z) that combines a weighted graph (G,W ) and the vectors
of opinions s = (s1, . . . , sn) and z = (z1, . . . , zn), which are attributes of the nodes. The internal opinion si is
unchanged and not affected by opinion updates, while each player’s strategy is represented by his/her stated opinion
zi, which may be different from his/her si and gets updated [16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. The paper by Buechel
et al. [25] differs from all these papers by mainly as it considers true and stated opinions evolving over time according
to different laws.
In [25] the utility of agent i depends on the distance of true opinion si to stated opinion zi as well as on the distance
of stated opinion zi to group opinion qi. Bindel et al. [16] study the price of anarchy — the ratio between the cost
of the Nash equilibrium and the cost of the optimal solution — in a game of opinion formation. They assume that
person i has an internal opinion si, which remains unchanged from external influences, and a stated opinion zi which
is updated as a weighted sum of his/her’ neiughbours’ stated opinions
zi =
si +
∑
j∈N(i) wijzj
1 +
∑
j∈N(i) wij
(1)
2
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where wi,j ≥ 0. Both opinions are assumed to be real numbers. Updating zi as in (1) allows to minimize the cost
function
(zi − si)
2 +
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(zj − zi)
2 . (2)
Both papers, [16] and [25], are inspired by classical models due to DeGroot [26] and Friedkin-Johnsen [27]. Also in
[25] both opinions zi and si are assumed to be real numbers.
Gionis et al. [17] follow the framework of Bindel et al. [16], by considering equations (1) and (2) as update rule
and personal cost function. The internal and external opinions have been modeled as real values in the interval [0, 1].
Gionis et al. study the CAMPAIGN problem, whose goal is to identify a set of target nodes T , whose positive opinion
about an information item will maximize the overall positive opinion for the item in the social network. The objective
function to maximize is therefore g(z) =
∑n
i=1 zi.
Bhawalkar et al. [18] analyze the equilibrium outcomes of symmetric co-evolutionary game and the K-nearest neigh-
bor (K-NN) game, distinguishing between internal and stated opinions with the usual symbols si and zi (which are
real numbers). In the K-NN game, each agent has exactlyK friends, so the interaction is of the nearest neighbors type
and the size of N(i) is exactlyK for each agent i.
Ferraioli et al. [19] continue the study of Bindel et al. by simplifying their model to the case of binary opinion zi,
which can be found in the individual’s voting intention in a referendum, while si ∈ [0, 1]. They study best-response
dynamics and show upper and lower bounds on the convergence to Nash equilibria.
The cost function considered by Chierichetti et al. [20] (where update rules for zi and si are not present) replaces
the quadratic terms in [16] by distances in a discrete metric space while si belongs to a discrete set (binary in some
special cases)1 and zi ∈ R. The authors adopt a strategy z minimizing the social cost function as an optimal solution
and establish bounds on the price of stability2
Auletta et al. [21] consider a personal cost that is defined through a monotone non-decreasing function of z, assuming
binary zi and si (without update rules for them). The authors called that class generalized discrete preference games.
In particular, they show that every game with two strategies per agent that admits a generalized ordinal potential is
structurally equivalent (in particular, better-response equivalent) to a generalized discrete preference game. In another
work [22], the same authors consider the game in which agents are utility maximizers, zi, si ∈ {0, 1} and address the
questions of price of stability/price of anarchy of a game in terms of the social welfare: SW (z) :=
∑
i ui(z).
Bilò et al. [23] focus on the case in which, for each player i, the innate opinion si ∈ [0, 1], while the expressed opinion
zi ∈ {0, 1}. They define a cost-minimization n-player game. Bilò et al. show that any game in this class always admits
an ordinal potential that implies the existence of pure Nash equilibria and convergence of better-response dynamics
starting from any arbitrary strategy profile. The social optimum is obtained with respect to the problem of minimizing
the sum of the players’ costs. They also focus on the efficiency losses due to selfish behavior and give upper and lower
bounds on the price of anarchy and lower bounds on the price of stability.
In [24], Chen et al. bound the price of anarchy for a game in which both si and zi are real numbers.
3 Agent-Based Model
In this Section we introduce an ABM to study the personal finance game. In our ABM there are three classes of
agents:
• a bank (B);
• a financial advisor (A);
• a set of n customers or customers (CLi, i = 1, . . . , n).
Our model falls in the literature framework of opinion formation gameswhere game players can express some opinions
and may change them according to the interactions with the other agents. For some of them the opinions they express
need not coincide with their true opinions. The opinions concern investment decisions.
1The authors refer to this class of games as discrete preference games.
2The price of stability is a measure of the game efficiency that is commonly adopted instead of the price of anarchy when
multiple Nash equilibria are present, and is defined as on the ratio between the social cost of the best Nash equilibrium and the
optimal solution. We return to the subject in Section 5.
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The aim of bank B is to steer the customers towards a particular investment decision, represented by an opinion
w ∈ R+. For example, w could concern the decision to buy a security S1 rather than a different security S2 or other
financial instruments.
The financial advisor A expresses an opinion s ∈ R+ which need not coincide with his/her true opinion x ∈ R+,
respectively referred to in the following as the stated opinion and the internal opinion. The financial advisor may
therefore be untruthful. A is paid by B and he/she gives advice (by way of s) to customers when invited to do so,
but the stated opinion s might not perfectly correspond to the one recommended by bank, w (to preserve his/her good
reputation, for instance).
customers have their opinions ci, i = 1, . . . , n , which fall within the range [di, s] where s is the stated opinion and
di ≤ s is a positive lower bound, which represents the opinion that the customer i would assume if there wasn’t any
interaction with A. The opinions of all customers are collected in c := (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ Rn.
Opinions ci, i = 1, . . . , n and s change over time, i.e. ci = ci (t) i = 1, . . . , n and s = s(t), while w, x and d are
fixed over time. However, we assume that all the opinions lie within the range [0, 1].
In the spirit of the models [28, 25], we consider a utility function forA that depends on the incentive to be truthful (the
intrinsic part) and the incentive to steer the customers towards w (the remunerative part). The incentive to be truthful
could be related to the Advisor’s conscience or to the desire of the Advisor to keep his/her reputation. Additionally,
we assume that the utility function for A also depends on the desire to influence the customers. The resulting utility
function is supposed to be a quadratic form in the opinions and to be additive.
Thus, the utility of the financial advisor depends on the distance of his/her true opinion x to his/her stated opinion s as
well as on the distance of the bank’s desired investment decision w to customers opinions c and the distance between
s and c:
uA(c, s, w, x) = −α (s− x)
2 − β
n∑
i=1
(w − ci)
2 − γ
n∑
i=1
(s− ci)
2
, (3)
where α, β, γ > 0; β is the remuneration coefficient for A and is paid by bankB. The more customers eventually buy
the security pushed forward by the bank B, the more the advisor A is remunerated.
The advisor’s strategic leverage is the stated opinion s, and his/her aim is to maximize his/her utility:
max
s
uA(c, s, w, x). (4)
To define the utility of customers CLi, i = 1, . . . , n, we introduce the following returns on their investments:
• rs, which is the return proposed by A to all the customers;
• rdi , which is the return that each customer considers that he/she can achieve through a “good” investment
decision.
The customer i would like to get rdi but he/she does not completely trust herself (the customer is not assumed to be
a financial expert)) and moves towards rs. In general, two possible situations may occur: rs ≤ rdi and rs > rdi . In
the first, A proposes to the customer i a return that is less (or equal) than expectations of CLi while in the second we
have the opposite. The rationales for the two cases are respectively that the financial advisor is able to find a better
investment than the customers due to his/her superior financial expertise or that customers have unrealistic expectations
due to their poor knowledge of financial markets.
We assume that the utility of each customer i depends on his/her lack of agreement with the advisor A. This cognitive
dissonance [16] provides customers with an incentive to modify their behavior to reduce the “cost” of this lack of
consensus. Remember that customers have their opinions ci, which fall within the range [di, s] where advisor’s stated
opinion s is a positive upper bound for them, and that parameter di represents the opinion that the customer i would
assume if there weren’t any interaction with A. Thus, the utility of CLi assumes value rs if ci = s but depends on the
distance of his/her opinion ci to the advisor’s stated opinion s in all the other cases:
uCLi(ci, di, s) = rdi +
ci − di
s− di
(rs − rdi)− ζ(s− ci)
2 , (5)
where ζ > 0 (∀i = 1, . . . , n) represents the sensitivity of customer to cognitive dissonance. Let us observe that the
following consequences hold:
(a) 0 ≤ ci−di
s−di
≤ 1 since di ≤ ci ≤ s;
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(b) rdi +
ci−di
s−di
(rs − rdi) ≥ 0 for ci ∈ [di, s] because of consequence (a) and rs, rdi > 0;
(c)
[
rdi +
ci−di
s−di
(rs − rdi)
]
ci=di
= rdi and
[
rdi +
ci−di
s−di
(rs − rdi)
]
ci=s
= rs → uCLi(s, di, s) = rs and
uCLi(di, di, s) = rdi − ζ(di − ci)
2 (in the latter case the cost of lack of consensus is maximum).
4 Personal finance game and Nash equilibria
The model described in Section 3 describes the opinion dynamics of a financial advisor and his/her customers, where
the opinions are influenced by each other’s choice. This interaction can therefore be considered as a strategic game,
where the players are the financial advisor and his/her customers (the bank’s role is just to set the fixed aim w and the
incentive β) and their strategic leverages are respectively the stated opinion s and the opinions c′is.
In this Section we solve the personal finance game by deriving the Nash equilibria. We also investigate their admissi-
bility, i.e., their compatibility with the constraints embedded in the model.
4.1 Nash equilibria
We now find the Nash equilibrium of the n+ 1-player game (n customers plus one financial advisor) using their best
response functions. The best response functions aim at maximizing the players’ utilities:

max
s
uA(c, s, w, x)
max
ci
uCLi(ci, di, s) , i = 1, . . . , n .
(6)
For any ci, we obtain the optimal s by zeroing the derivative of the utility
∂uA(c, s, w, x)
∂s
= −2α (s− x) − 2γ
n∑
i=1
(s− ci)
= −2αs+ 2αx− 2γns+ 2γ
n∑
i=1
ci = 0 . (7)
Turning to customers utility and fixing s, we obtain
∂uCLi(ci, di, s)
∂ci
=
rs − rdi
s− di
+ 2ζ(s− ci) . (8)
Then the system (6) that expresses best response functions becomes:{
−2αs+ 2αx− 2γns+ 2γ
∑n
i=1 ci = 0
rs−rdi
s−di
+ 2ζ(s− ci) = 0 .
(9)
The solution of the system of linear equations is the advisor’s best response function
s =
1
α+ γn
(
αx+ γ
n∑
i=1
ci
)
, (10)
which is a linear function of the customers’ opinions. Similarly, the customers’ best response function is given by
ci =
rs − rdi
2ζ(s− di)
+ s . (11)
For the sake of simplicity, consider the special case where all the customers have the same initial opinion and expecta-
tions, i.e., rdi = rd and di = d ∀i = 1, . . . , n, so that all the customers take the same investment decision, i.e., ci = c.
Sometimes we will denote this case as the case of homogeneous investors.
Then, the best response functions become simply
s =
αx+ γnc
α+ γn
(12)
and
c =
rs − rd
2ζ(s− d)
+ s . (13)
5
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Figure 1: Best response functions of financial advisor (blue) and customers (red). Parameters: rs−rd = −0.1, ζ = 10,
d = 0.1, α = 0.05, x = 0.4, γ = 0.2, n = 1.
We plot the best response functions of both players in Fig. 1 for a sample case. We see that the best response function
of the financial advisor in Equation (12) is a linear function of the customers’ opinion, with a slope γn
α+γn < 1, while
the best response function of the customers in Equation (13) is the sum of an angle bisector and a homographic function
with a vertical asymptote at s = d. The Nash equilibria are represented by the intersection of the two curves. Note the
presence of two Nash equilibria.
In order to compute the the equilibria, we solve the system (9) for di = d. Here, by substitution we obtain
−2αs+ 2αx+
γ
ζ
n
rs − rd
s− d
= 0 , (14)
from which
2αs2 − 2α (d+ x) s+ 2αxd−
γn
ζ
(rs − rd) = 0 , (15)
for s 6= d. Accordingly, the two Nash equilibria are:
P ∗ = (s∗, c∗1, . . . , c
∗
n) =
(
a,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
a− d
+ a, . . . ,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
a− d
+ a
)
P † = (s†, c†1, . . . , c
†
n) =
(
b,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b − d
+ b, . . . ,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b − d
+ b
)
, (16)
where
a =
d+ x
2
+
1
2
√
(d− x)2 +
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd)
b =
d+ x
2
−
1
2
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) (17)
are the roots of quadratic equation (15).
We can now examine the dependence of the Nash equilibria on the model parameters, recalling that γ measures
the importance of the advisor’s influence on customers, α measures the importance of truthfulness, β measures the
importance of remuneration for the advisor’s choice, and ζ measures the importance of belief in the advisor’s stated
opinion (i.e., the cognitive dissonance). The curves are shown in Figs. 2-4, where the parameters are held fixed
excepting that of interest. The curves shows how the two equilibria move, with an arrow indicating the direction of
growth of the parameter of interest. A triangular region is shown as bounded by the two straight lines: equilibria
falling outside that region are not acceptable since they violate the constraint on customers’ opinion (d ≤ c ≤ s).
Impact of cognitive dissonance
In response to changes in ζ, Nash equilibria are placed along the dash-dotted line in Fig. 2. When ζ increases, both
6
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Figure 2: Nash equilibria’ dependence on increasing values of ζ. Fixed parameters: rs − rd = −0.1, d = 0.1,
α = 0.05, x = 0.4, γ = 0.2, n = 1. For ζ = 5 we obtain no real Nash equilibria.
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Figure 3: Nash equilibria’ dependence on increasing values of α. Fixed parameters: rs− rd = −0.1, d = 0.1, ζ = 10,
x = 0.4, γ = 0.2, n = 1.
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Figure 4: Nash equilibria’ dependence on decreasing values of γ. Fixed parameters: rs− rd = −0.1, d = 0.1, ζ = 10,
x = 0.4, α = 0.05, n = 1. For γ = 0.3 we obtain no real Nash equilibria.
equilibria tend to pull away and to accumulate in different areas. This is because, if we fix n = 1 and assume e.g.
d < x, as ζ tends to∞ the equilibria P ∗ and P † in (16) become
lim
ζ→+∞
(
a,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
a− d
+ a
)
= (x, x)
lim
ζ→+∞
(
b,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b− d
+ b
)
=
(
d, d−
α(x − d)
γ
)
. (18)
As ζ tends to∞, the second of (18) represents an unreachable limit because there exists a number ζ¯ > 0 such that, for
each ζ > ζ¯, the support of the curve(
b,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b− d
+ b
)
where b =
d+ x
2
−
1
2
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) (19)
goes out the triangular acceptance region (see Fig. 2, the squared branch). If we assume that, for ζ = ζ¯ , the curve(
b, 12ζ
rs−rd
b−d + b
)
falls right onto the horizontal side of the triangle, we define
(
b,
1
2ζ¯
rs − rd
b− d
+ b
)
where b =
d+ x
2
−
1
2
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ¯
(rs − rd) (20)
the last useful equilibrium. The critical value ζ¯ can be found by imposing
1
2ζ¯
rs − rd
b− d
+ b = d where b =
d+ x
2
−
1
2
√
(d− x)2 +
2γn
αζ¯
(rs − rd) (21)
because c = d represents the horizontal side of the triangular acceptance region (let us remember that d ≤ c ≤ s).
Then, from (21) it is easily to prove that
ζ¯ = −
1
2
(
α+ γ
α
)2
rs − rd
(x− d)2
. (22)
The value in (22) is positive if rs < rd. Calculated in (22), the last useful equilibrium is(
d+ x
2
−
1
2
|(d− x)(α − γ)|
α+ γ
, d
)
. (23)
8
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Remark 4.1. For the sake of simplicity, Eq. (18) have been obtained for the particular case d < x. Anyway, it is
possible to prove that
lim
ζ→+∞
(
a,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
a− d
+ a
)
=
(
d+ x
2
+
|d− x|
2
,
d+ x
2
+
|d− x|
2
− α
x− d− |x− d|
2γ
)
lim
ζ→+∞
(
b,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b− d
+ b
)
=
(
d+ x
2
−
|d− x|
2
,
d+ x
2
−
|d− x|
2
− α
x− d+ |x− d|
2γ
)
. (24)
Impact of advisor’s truthfulness
A similar result also applies to the case α→ +∞. Actually, if we assume d < x, as α tends to∞ the equilibria P ∗ in
(16) is
lim
α→+∞
(
a,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
a− d
+ a
)
= (x, x) (25)
while P † is excluded because this time
lim
α→+∞
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b− d
+ b =∞ . (26)
This case corresponds to an advisor that is very sensitive to the difference between his/her stated and true opinion, i.e.
to the difference between what he/she says and what he/she really thinks. See Fig. 3.
Impact of trust in the advisor
Fig. 4 shows that, as γ approaches to zero, only one equilibria survives. Actually, for n = 1 and d < x, as γ → 0 the
equilibria P ∗ in (16) is
lim
γ→0
(
a,
1
2ζ
rs − rd
a− d
+ a
)
=
(
x,
rs − rd
2ζ(x− d)
+ x
)
(27)
while P † is excluded because
lim
γ→0
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b− d
+ b =∞ . (28)
Since γ tells us how wide is the advisor’s desire to influence the customers, when γ = 0 (and all the other parameters
are fixed and 6= 0) his/her equilibrium is represented by his/her internal opinion. (There is no desire to influence the
customers, then there is no reason to tell a lie.) Observe also that rs−rd2ζ(x−d) +x < x if rs < rd; in this situation the Nash
equilibrium is acceptable and the equilibrium solution for customer is different from the advisor’s internal opinion.
Remark 4.2. In the above bullet list we have considered α, ζ → +∞ and γ → 0. The same considerations remain
true, in approximation, if we substitute α, ζ → +∞ and γ → 0 with finite values such that 2γn
αζ
rs−rd
(d−x)2
≪ 1. E.g. in
(17): √
1 +
2γn
αζ
rs − rd
(d− x)2
≈ 1 +
γn
αζ
rs − rd
(d− x)2
+ . . . (29)
whenever 2γn
αζ
|rs−rd|
(d−x)2
< 1.
Let us conclude this section by considering the dependence of Nash equilibria on the increasing measure of importance
of the influence on customers, γ, which is depicted in Fig. 5. Observe that, if γ gets too big, both equilibria become
not real.
4.1.1 Admissibility of the Nash equilibria
In this Section we derive the parameter region in which Nash equilibria, obtained in Section 4.1, stay coherent with
opinion variable definition. For example, since c1, . . . , cn, s shall fall within the range [0, 1], the coordinates of Nash
equilibria are constrained between 0 and 1, and hence we obtain the conditions on parameters to ensure that. We will
focus on the special case, i.e. rdi = rd and di = d ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
In our model we distinguish between strategic variables and parameters. The first of these are ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and
s, while the latter are d, x, w, n, α, β, γ, ζ, rd, rs. The set of all numeric values that they can assume are called,
respectively, the domain D and the admissible parameter regionR.
9
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s
c
P ∗
P †
Figure 5: Nash equilibria’ dependence on γ, like in Fig. 4 but for increasing values of the parameter. Fixed parameters:
rs − rd = −0.1, d = 0.5, ζ = 100, x = 0.7, α = 8, n = 1.
From the assumptions on opinion variables and parameters, we have that
D :=
{
(c1, . . . , cn, s)
∣∣ d ≤ ci ≤ s ∀i = 1, . . . , n, s ∈ [d, 1]} , (30)
R :=
{
(d, x, w, n, β, γ, ζ, α, rs, rd)
∣∣ d, x, w ∈ [0, 1] ,
n ∈ N , β, γ, ζ, α > 0 , rd, rs ∈ [0, 1]} . (31)
Let us denote with
Y n = Y × Y × · · · × Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
= {(y1, . . . , yn) | yi ∈ Y for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} (32)
the n-ary Cartesian power of a set Y . Hence, the domain can be rewritten as
D = [d, s]n × [d, 1] , (33)
Let us derive conditions on the parameters (in other words, subsets ofR) which ensure the existence of P ∗ and P †, by
distinguishing between two cases, (A) rs = rd and (B) rs 6= rd.
Case (A), rs = rd. In view of this, Nash equilibria becomes:
P ∗ = (s∗, c∗1, . . . , c
∗
n) =
(
d+ x
2
+
|d− x|
2
, . . . ,
d+ x
2
+
|d− x|
2
)
P † = (s†, c†1, . . . , c
†
n) =
(
d+ x
2
−
|d− x|
2
, . . . ,
d+ x
2
−
|d− x|
2
)
. (34)
We have the following result:
Proposition 4.3. Let rs = rd. The Personal Finance Game admits the following Nash equilibria:

P ∗ = (x, . . . , x) , P † = (d, . . . , d) for d < x
P ∗ = P † for d = x
P ∗ = (d, . . . , d) for d > x
(35)
Proof. By virtue of constraints (30), the admissible parameter regions in which P ∗ and P † are acceptable Nash
equilibria are described by:
R∗1 =
{
0 ≤ d ≤ d+x2 +
|d−x|
2 ≤ 1
}
, R†1 =
{
0 ≤ d ≤ d+x2 −
|d−x|
2 ≤ 1
}
(36)
and
where we denoted byR∗1, R
†
1 ⊆ R these regions (R
∗
1 for P
∗ andR†1 for P
†). 
Case (B), rs 6= rd. Let us denoted by R∗1, R
†
1 ⊆ R the admissible parameter regions in which, respectively, P
∗ and
P † are acceptable Nash equilibria. Then
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Proposition 4.4. Let rs 6= rd, then
R∗1 =[0, x)× [0, 1]
2 × N× (0,+∞)3×
×
[(
(0, γn)× [rd − r
(1)
d , rd)× [0, 1]
)
∪
(
[γn,+∞)× [rd − r
(2)
d , rd)
)
× [0, 1]
]
(37)
and
R†1 = [0, x)× [0, 1]
2 × N× (0,+∞)3 × (0, γn)× [rd − r
(1)
d , rd − r
(2)
d ]× [0, 1] (38)
where with r
(1)
d , r
(2)
d we denoted, respectively,
αζ
2γn(x− d)
2 and 2ζα2
(
x−d
α+γn
)2
.
Proof. The completed proof is given in Appendix. 
Remark 4.5. The intersectionR†1 ∩R
∗
1 is not empty. Then, for parameters values inR
†
1 ∩R
∗
1, the two Nash equilibria
P ∗ and P † are both acceptable (see e.g. Fig. 1).
Remark 4.6. Focusing on rs range in the equation of admissible parameter region R∗1 ∪ R
†
1, the equations (37) and
(38), we notice that rs < rd. The customer i, that in our paper is a small investor, could be naive about incentives
and expects a return bigger than the one advisor A proposes instead to her. However, A, who can choose to express
an opinion which need not coincide with his/her true opinion, is supposed to be unbiased: they do not manipulate the
expectations of naive investors, which can be translated in the condition rs 6= rd. See, e.g., [3] for the role of advisors
and their communication process with investors in generating divergence of opinion, [29] for evidence on investor
reaction to recommendations and [30] for evidence on analyst incentives.
4.2 The boundary of D
s
c1
s
c1
c2
Figure 6: Graphical representation of ∂D for two (n = 1, on the left) and three (n = 2, on the right) dimensional
spaces. The boundaries are highlighted in different colors.
The following result characterizes mathematically the boundary of the set D described in (30) and denoted by ∂D. A
graphical representation of ∂D for two and three dimensional spaces is depicted in Fig. 6, where the boundaries are
highlighted in different colors. Mathematically, since
D :=
{
(c1, s)
∣∣ d ≤ c1 ≤ s ≤ 1} , n = 1 (39)
and
D :=
{
(c1, c2, s)
∣∣ d ≤ c1 ≤ s ≤ 1 , d ≤ c2 ≤ s ≤ 1} , n = 2 (40)
they are described respectively by
∂D := {c1 = d , s ∈ [d, 1]} ∪ {s = 1 , c1 ∈ [d, 1]} ∪ {s = c1 , c1 ∈ [d, 1]} (41)
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for n = 1, and
∂D := {c1 = d , s ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c2 ≤ s} ∪ {d ≤ c1 ≤ s , c2 = d , s ∈ [d, 1]} (42)
∪{s = 1 , c1, c2 ∈ [d, 1]} ∪ {s = c1 , c1 ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c2 ≤ c1} (43)
∪{s = c2 , c2 ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c1 ≤ c2} (44)
for n = 2. Another example (four dimensional space) has equation
D =
{
(c1, c2, c3, s)
∣∣ d ≤ c1 ≤ s ≤ 1 , d ≤ c2 ≤ s ≤ 1 , d ≤ c3 ≤ s ≤ 1} , (45)
for n = 3 and then
∂D := {c1 = d , s ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c2 ≤ s , d ≤ c3 ≤ s}∪ (46)
∪{c2 = d , s ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c1 ≤ s , d ≤ c3 ≤ s}∪ (47)
∪{c3 = d , s ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c1 ≤ s , d ≤ c2 ≤ s} ∪ {s = 1 , c1, c2, c3 ∈ [d, 1]}∪ (48)
∪{s = c1 , c1 ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c2 ≤ c1 , d ≤ c3 ≤ c1} (49)
∪{s = c2 , c2 ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c1 ≤ c2 , d ≤ c3 ≤ c2} (50)
∪{s = c3 , c3 ∈ [d, 1] , d ≤ c1 ≤ c3 , d ≤ c2 ≤ c3} . (51)
Proposition 4.7. The boundary of domain D, described by (30), is
∂D =
{
(c1, . . . , cn, s) ∈ [d, 1]
n+1 :
max
i=1,...,n
ci ≤ s ∧
[
n∏
i=1
(ci − d) (s− ci)
]
(s− 1) = 0
}
. (52)
Proof. Let us consider the set (30), where d ≤ ci ≤ s ≤ 1 ∀i = 1, . . . , n. Fix j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and assume
maxi=1,...,n ci = cj .
Fix, for example, c1 = d then we still have d ≤ ci ≤ s ≤ 1, i.e. d ≤ ci ≤ s ∧ d ≤ s ≤ 1, ∀i = 2, . . . , n. Relation
d ≤ s ≤ 1 and d ≤ ci ≤ 1 are verified by definition while the truthfulness of ci ≤ s is ensured by cj ≤ s, because
ci ≤ cj ∀i = 1, . . . , n by definition. The same can be concluded for every ci = d.
Finally, we note that if s = 1 thenmaxi=1,...,n ci ≤ 1 which corresponds to require (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ [d, 1]n. 
5 Price of stability
In Section 4,we have seen that our gamemay have at most two Nash equilibria. Those equilibria represent the outcome
of the strategic interaction of the players, i.e. the advisor and the customers (the individual investors), to maximize
their own utilities. However, their decisions may differ from what could be achieved if the overall maximum utility
would be sought. Therefore, the utility achieved under a Nash equilibrium could be globally not efficient. In the cases
with a single Nash equilibrium, this loss of efficiency can be computed through the Price of Anarchy. In the case of
more Nash equilibria, like ours, that concept has been generalized into the Price of Stability (PoS) [31]. In this section,
we compute the Price of Stability for our game.
For the price of stability we adopt the definition of [31]:
PoS =
value of best equilibrium
value of optimal solution
. (53)
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Let us denote uA(c, s, w, x) := uA(c, s) and uCLi(ci, di, s) := uCLi(ci). We now calculate the utility functions
outcomes in Nash equilibria P ∗ and P †. Then:
uA(P
∗) = −α (a− x)
2
− βn
(
w −
1
2ζ
rs − rd
a− d
− a
)2
−
γn
4ζ2
(
rs − rd
a− d
)2
uCLi(P
∗) = rs +
1
4ζ
(
rs − rd
a− d
)2
(54)
and
uA(P
†) = −α (b − x)
2
− βn
(
w −
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b− d
− b
)2
−
γn
4ζ2
(
rs − rd
b− d
)2
uCLi(P
†) = rs +
1
4ζ
(
rs − rd
b− d
)2
. (55)
The social welfare, i.e. the total utility of the agents, is:
SW (c, s) = uA(c, s) +
n∑
i=1
uCLi(ci, s)
= −α (s− x)
2
− β
n∑
i=1
(w − ci)
2
− (γ + ζ)
n∑
i=1
(s− ci)
2
+ rdn+
rs − rd
s− d
[
−dn+
n∑
i=1
ci
]
. (56)
Because of the mixed terms in ci and s, the optimal solution of i-th customer depends on the choices done by financial
advisor.
Whether the maxima of SW belong to D or ∂D, is a question that is addressed and fully solved by Proposition 5.1
below.
In the following, for any complex number z = x+ iy where x and y are real numbers, the absolute value or modulus
of z is denoted |z| and is defined by |z| =
√
x2 + y2.
The following preliminary result concerns the roots of a quartic equation. A general method for solving quartic
equations is found in Cardano’s Ars Magna, but it is attributed to Cardano’s assistant Ludovico Ferrari (1522-1565)
[32].
Proposition 5.1. Let us consider
ω4z
4 + ω3z
3 + ω1z + ω0 = 0 , (57)
where ω0, ω4 > 0, ω1, ω3 ∈ R (ω1, ω3 both negative or both positive). Let also
∆ = 256ω34ω
3
0 − 192ω
2
4ω3ω1ω
2
0 − 27ω
2
4ω
4
1 − 6ω4ω
2
3ω
2
1ω0 − 27ω
4
3ω
2
0 − 4ω
3
3ω
3
1
D = 64ω34ω0 − 16ω
2
4ω3ω1 − 3ω
4
3 , P = −3ω
2
3 , R = ω
3
3 + 8ω1ω
2
4 . (58)
The following are proved:
(i) All the roots of (57) are not-real if and only if ∆ > 0 andD > 0.
(ii) There exists at least one root of (57) which has positive real part.
(iii) Let
Ω =
{
ω0, ω1,ω3, ω4 : ω4 − |ω1| − |ω3|+ ω0 > 0 ,
4ω4 − |ω1| − 3|ω3| < 0 , (∆ ≤ 0 orD ≤ 0)
}
(59)
be a subset of the admissible parameter regionR. Then, ∀ωi ∈ Ω all the roots of (57) have modulus> 1.
Proof. The completed proof is given in Appendix. 
We now turn our attention to finding the maximum of the function (c, s)→ SW (c, s) in the set D described in (30).
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Theorem 5.2. Let ∆, D, P, R and Ω like in Proposition 5.1. Let also SW be the social welfare function as in (56) and
let
ω0 = n(rd − rs)
2
ω1 = 2βn(rd − rs)(d − w)
ω2 = 0
ω3 = 4 [βn(d− w)(γ + ζ) + α(d− x)(β + γ + ζ)]
ω4 = 4 [βn(γ + ζ) + α(β + γ + ζ)] . (60)
Then the following claims hold.
i) If ∆ > 0 andD > 0, or ωi ∈ Ω ∀i = 0, . . . , 4, the function SW attains its maximum in a point belonging to
∂D.
ii) Let y = s− d ∈ [0, 1]. In all the other cases in which SW results concave, the function attains its maximum
in a point (c1, . . . , cn, s) ∈ D such that
ω4y
4 + ω3y
3 + ω2y
2 + ω1y + ω0 = 0 (61)
and
c1 = · · · = cn =
2βw + 2(γ + ζ)s+ rs−rd
s−d
2β + 2(γ + ζ)
. (62)
Proof. Let us first consider the maximum points of SW that are internal to D, namely in
int (D) :=
{
(c1, . . . , cn, s)
∣∣ d < ci < s ∀i = 1, . . . , n, s ∈ [d, 1]} . (63)
Being SW of class C∞, the maximum points in int (D) can be found amongst the stationary points, in other words
amongst the points (c1, . . . , cn, s) ∈ int (D) such that ∇SW (c1, . . . , cn, s) = (0, . . . , 0). We have that

∂SW (c1,...,cn,s)
∂c1
= 0
. . .
∂SW (c1,...,cn,s)
∂cn
= 0
∂SW (c1,...,cn,s)
∂s
= 0 ,
(64)
thus
c1 = · · · = cn =
2βw + 2(γ + ζ)s+ rs−rd
s−d
2β + 2(γ + ζ)
(65)
and
− 2α (s− x)− 2(γ + ζ)n
(
s−
2βw + 2(γ + ζ)s + rs−rd
s−d
2β + 2(γ + ζ)
)
+
−
rs − rd
(s− d)2
[
2β(w − d) + 2(γ + ζ)(s − d) + rs−rd
s−d
2β + 2(γ + ζ)
]
n = 0 (66)
Rearrange the terms of the latter equation:
2α (s− x) (2β + 2(γ + ζ))(s − d)3+
+ 2(γ + ζ)n
[
2β(s− w)(s− d)3 − (rs − rd)(s− d)
2
]
+
+ (rs − rd)
[
2β(w − d)(s− d) + 2(γ + ζ)(s− d)2 + (rs − rd)
]
n = 0 (67)
which, substituting the new variable y = s − d ∈ [0, 1], yields the polynomial equation (61), where ω0, ..., ω4 are
described in (60). This proves claim ii).
However, as we can see, ω0 and ω4 are ≥ 0. Accordingly, by assumption of claim i) and from Proposition 5.1 the
social welfare function does not assume (admissible) maxima in D and so we have to focus on ∂D. And this proves
claim i). 
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According to Theorem 5.2, let us denote the maximum values assumed by function SW with SWM and assume that it
is global. Then, from the definition of PoS described by Eq. (53), we have
PoS =
max
{
uA(P
∗) +
∑n
i=1 uCLi(P
∗) , uA(P
†) +
∑n
i=1 uCLi(P
†)
}
SWM
(68)
where the utility functions estimated in P ∗ and P † are shown in (54) and (55). One can look at Eq. (68) as how much
the central authority can earn if he/she can intervene in the game, helping the players (advisor, customers) converge to
a good Nash equilibrium.
6 Conclusions and further works
Investors usually resort to financial advisors (paid by a bank) to improve their investment process until the point of
complete delegation on investment decisions. Surely, financial advice is potentially a correcting factor in investment
decisions but, in the past, the media and regulators blamed biased advisors for manipulating the expectations of naive
investors. Then we wondered whether that was indeed the case and we built an ABM for the communication process
between bank, advisors and investors.
We defined a compromise for the financial advisor (between a sufficient reward by bank and to keep his/her reputation),
and a compromise for the customers (between the desired return and the proposed return by advisor). In this way, the
notion of PoS — which we also analytically formulated — naturally arisen in our model.
Moreover, we obtained two Nash equilibria and the best response functions of the resulting game. Anyway, one of
these equilibria is not always acceptable:
• The presence of a very truthful advisor translates into the presence of only one Nash equilibria (represented by
his/her internal opinion). This case corresponds to an advisor that is very sensitive to the difference between
his/her stated and true opinion, i.e. to the difference between what he/she says and what he/she really thinks.
• If the advisor’s desire to influence the customers is irrelevant, only one equilibria survives and his/her equi-
librium is represented by his/her internal opinion.
• The same equilibria associated to advisor’s internal opinion survives when the sensitivity of customer to
cognitive dissonance becomes strong. Cognitive dissonance provides customers with an incentive to modify
their behavior to reduce the “cost” of the lack of agreement between advisor and customers. Then this case
corresponds to customers that are very sensitive to the difference between his/her opinion and advisor’s stated
opinion.
Then, by describing the parameter regions in which both equilibria result acceptable, we shown that they exist whether
customers expect a return bigger than what advisor proposes instead to them: we can say that greediness/naivety of
the customers emerge naturally from the model.
The results of the paper concern the special case of homogeneous investors. It would be interesting to extend the
results of the paper to the more general case of non-homogeneous investors. Moreover, although a number of analytic
results obtained here for this special case, a closed-form expression of PoS seems to be unmanageable. We feel that a
widespread use of simulation tools may help the understanding these open questions in future works.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
According to the theory of quartic equations [33], all the roots of (57) are non-real only in the following cases
• ∆ > 0 andD > 0
• ∆ > 0 and P > 0
• ∆ = 0 andD = 0 and P > 0 and R = 0.
Since P = −3ω23 < 0, we see that all the roots of (57) are non-real if and only if∆ > 0 andD > 0.
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For the proof of (ii) let f(z) be LHS of (57). Then, f ′(z) = 4ω4z3 + 3ω3z2 + ω1. We have that f ′(z) = 0 has only
one real root because the discriminant of the cubic equation f ′(z) = 0,∆3 (see [33]), is negative
∆3 = −108ω
3
3ω1 − 432ω
2
4ω
2
1 < 0 . (69)
It follows that the number of the real roots of the quartic equation (57) is at most two.
Our proof proceeds by reductio ad absurdum. Let us assume that all the roots of (57) have negative real part. The roots
may be a, b, c + di, c − di where a, b, c, d ∈ R+ with a < 0, b < 0, c < 0, d > 0 or a + bi, a − bi, c + di, c − di
where a, b, c, d ∈ R+ with a < 0, b > 0, c < 0, d > 0.
Since the coefficient of z2 is 0, we get, by Vieta’s formulas (see “Newton’s Identities” in [34]),
0
ω4
= ab+ 2ac+ 2bc+ c2 + d2 (70)
for the first case and
0
ω4
= a2 + b2 + 4ac+ c2 + d2 (71)
for the second. In both cases, the LHS equals 0 while the RHS is positive. This is impossible.
For the proof of (iii) we already know, from (ii), that f ′(z) = 0 has only one real root. Besides, we have f ′′(z) = 0
⇐⇒ z = − ω32ω4 and z = 0.
Now, depending on the sign of ω1 and ω3 we have two different cases.
Case 1. Let ω1 > 0 and ω3 > 0. Since f ′(0) = ω1 > 0, we see that f ′(z) = 0 has only one real root z = α where
α < 0. It is necessary that f(−1) = ω4−ω3−ω1 +ω0 > 0 and that f(z) = 0 has at least one real root, i.e. ∆ ≤ 0 or
D ≤ 0 from (i). Since we have− ω32ω4 < 0 and f
′(0) = ω1 > 0 considering graphs in Fig. 7, we see that it is necessary
that f ′(−1) = −4ω4 + 3ω3 + ω1 > 0.
−2 −1 1 2
−1
1
α
z
y
−3 −2 −1
1
2
3
x
y
Figure 7: On the left: a graph of f ′(z). On the right: a graph of f(z). As we can see, f ′(α) = 0, f ′(−1) > 0,
f ′(0) > 0 and f(−1) > 0.
On the other hand, if f(−1) > 0, f ′(−1) > 0 and (∆ ≤ 0 or D ≤ 0) then, we see that all the real roots of (57) have
modulus greater than 1.
Case 2. Let ω1 < 0 and ω3 < 0. Since f ′(0) = ω1 < 0, we see that f ′(z) = 0 has only one real root z = β where
β > 0. It is necessary that f(1) = ω4 + ω3 + ω1 + ω0 > 0 and that f(z) = 0 has at least one real root, i.e. ∆ ≤ 0 or
D ≤ 0 from (i). Since we have 0 < − ω32ω4 and f
′(0) = ω1 < 0 considering graphs in Fig. 8, we see that it is necessary
that f ′(1) = 4ω4 + 3ω3 + ω1 < 0.
On the other hand, if f(1) > 0, f ′(1) < 0 and (∆ ≤ 0 or D ≤ 0) then, we see that all the real roots of (57) have
modulus greater than 1.
From the two cases, all the real roots of (57) have modulus> 1 whenever ω0, . . . , ω4 belong to the subset Ω. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 4.4
Let’s start to prove (37) and focus on (30). Then the admissible parameter region in which P ∗ is an acceptable Nash
equilibrium derives from the following inequalities:
0 ≤ d ≤
1
2ζ
rs − rd
a− d
+ a ≤ a ≤ 1 (72)
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Figure 8: On the left: a graph of f ′(z). On the right: a graph of f(z). As we can see, f ′(β) = 0, f ′(0) < 0, f ′(1) < 0
and f(1) > 0.
from which 

a ≤ 1
a ≥ 0
d ≤ a
d ≤ 12ζ
rs−rd
a−d + a
1
2ζ
rs−rd
a−d + a ≤ a
⇒


a ≤ 1
a ≥ 0
d ≤ a
d− a ≤ 12ζ
rs−rd
a−d
1
2ζ
rs−rd
a−d ≤ 0
(73)
By third equation of (73) — d ≤ a— from a ≥ 0 and, from a’s definition in (17), the system (73) becomes

d+ x
2
+
1
2
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤ 1 (74)
d ≤
d+ x
2
+
1
2
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) (75)
rd − 2ζ
(
x− d
2
+
1
2
√
(d− x)2 +
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd)
)2
≤ rs < rd (76)
Let us consider inequality (74): √
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤ 2− d− x . (77)
It has solution: 

(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
d+ x ≤ 2 (which is checked because d, x ∈ [0, 1])
rs ≤ rd +
2αζ
γn
(1− d− x+ dx)
(78)
which can be simplified in
rd −
αζ
2γn
(x− d)2 ≤ rs ≤ rd +
2αζ
γn
(1− d)(1 − x) . (79)
Let us consider inequality (75), √
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ d− x , (80)
whose solution is

(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
d− x ≥ 0
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ (d− x)
2
∪
{
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
d− x < 0
(81)
i.e. 

(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
d− x ≥ 0
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
∪
{
(d− x)2 + 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
d− x < 0
(82)
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But the third inequality of the first system of (82) is at odds with (76) and, hence, the solution of (75) comes down to{
rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn (d− x)
2
d < x
(83)
Let us consider inequality (76), which can be rewritten as follows
rd −
ζ
2
[
2 (d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd)+
+ 2(x− d)
√
(d− x)2 +
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd)
]
≤ rs (84)
and, since d < x— by (83) —, it follows that√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ −
(
1
ζ
+
γn
ζα
)
rs − rd
x− d
− (x− d) (85)
from which 

(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
−
(
1
ζ
+ γn
ζα
)
rs−rd
x−d − (x− d) ≥ 0
(d− x)2 + 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥
((
1
ζ
+ γn
ζα
)
rs−rd
x−d + (x− d)
)2 (86)
∪
{
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
−
(
1
ζ
+ γn
ζα
)
rs−rd
x−d − (x− d) < 0
(87)
It should be noted that d 6= x. Actually, if we substituted d = x in Eq. (84), we would get rd − rs +
γn
α
(rd − rs) ≤ 0
which does not have solutions for rs < rd.
We can rewrite system (86) in the following way

rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2
rs ≤ rd −
ζα
α+γn (x− d)
2
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥
((
1
ζ
+ γn
ζα
)
rs−rd
x−d + (x− d)
)2 (88)
The solutions of the first two inequalities intersect if α > γn while for the last one we have
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥
(
1
ζ
+
γn
ζα
)2(
rs − rd
x− d
)2
+ 2
(
1
ζ
+
γn
ζα
)
(rs − rd) (89)
which becomes
0 ≥
(
1
ζ
+
γn
ζα
)2(
rs − rd
x− d
)2
+
2
ζ
(rs − rd) , (90)
whose solution is
rd − 2ζα
2
(
x− d
α+ γn
)2
≤ rs < rd (91)
Then system (86) has an empty solution if α < γn and becomes

rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2 ≤ rs ≤ rd −
ζα
α+γn (x− d)
2
rd − 2ζα
2
(
x−d
α+γn
)2
≤ rs < rd
(92)
for α > γn. The solution of (86) is empty for α < γn but, for α > γn it is
rd − 2ζα
2
(
x− d
α+ γn
)2
≤ rs ≤ rd −
ζα
α+ γn
(x− d)
2 (93)
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since we have that rd −
αζ
2γn (x − d)
2 ≤ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x−d
α+γn
)2
for each parameters’ values. We now focus on system
(87): {
rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2(
1
ζ
+ γn
ζα
)
rs−rd
x−d + (x− d) > 0
⇒
{
rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn(x− d)
2
rs > rd −
ζα
α+γn (x− d)
2 (94)
whose solution is{
rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn
(x− d)2 , α < γn
}
∪
{
rs > rd −
ζα
α+ γn
(x− d)
2
, α > γn
}
. (95)
Accordingly, by merging (93) — for α > γn— and (95) we obtain the solution of (76):{
rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn
(x− d)2 , α < γn
}
∪
{
rs > rd −
ζα
α+ γn
(x− d)2 ∪
rd − 2ζα
2
(
x− d
α+ γn
)2
≤ rs ≤ rd −
ζα
α+ γn
(x− d)
2
, α > γn
}
. (96)
Hence, the solution of (76) is{
rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn
(x − d)2 , α < γn
}
∪
{
rs ≥ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x− d
α+ γn
)2
, α > γn
}
(97)
Let us observe that, by (76), the system (74)-(76) admits solution only if − 12 (x− d)
2 ≤ 2(1− d− x+ dx), which is
actually equivalent to (x+ d− 2)2 ≥ 0. Moreover, rd ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2. By substituting (79), (83) and (97) in the
system (74)-(76) we obtain 

rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2 ≤ rs ≤ rd +
2αζ
γn
(1− d)(1 − x)
d < x
α < γn
rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2 ≤ rs < rd
(98)
and 

rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2 ≤ rs ≤ rd +
2αζ
γn
(1− d)(1 − x)
d < x
α > γn
rd − 2ζα
2
(
x−d
α+γn
)2
≤ rs < rd
(99)
Since d, x ∈ [0, 1] we have that, for both systems, rd +
2αζ
γn
(1 − d)(1 − x) ≥ rd. Moreover, to (98) and (99) should
be added the conditions rd, rs ∈ [0, 1]. Hence we obtained thesis (37).
We now come to prove (38), by focusing on (30). Then the admissible parameter region in which P † is an acceptable
Nash equilibrium derives from the following inequalities:
0 ≤ d ≤
1
2ζ
rs − rd
b− d
+ b ≤ b ≤ 1 (100)
from which 

b ≤ 1
b ≥ 0
d ≤ b
d ≤ 12ζ
rs−rd
b−d + b
1
2ζ
rs−rd
b−d + b ≤ b
⇒


b ≤ 1
b ≥ 0
d ≤ b
d− b ≤ 12ζ
rs−rd
b−d
1
2ζ
rs−rd
b−d ≤ 0
(101)
By third formula of system (101) — d ≤ b— we can rearrange its fourth and fifth equations as, respectively, −(b −
d)2 ≤ 12ζ (rs − rd) and rs < rd. Moreover, b ≥ 0 if
d+ x ≥
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ⇒


d+ x ≥ 0
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
(d+ x)2 ≥ (d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd)
(102)
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but since d, x ≥ 0 and rs < rd, the latter becomes rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2 ≤ rs. Then the system (101) can be rewritten as

b ≤ 1
d ≤ b
1
2ζ (rs − rd) + (b− d)
2 ≥ 0
rd −
αζ
2γn(x− d)
2 ≤ rs < rd
(103)
or, from b’s definition in (17)

d+ x
2
−
1
2
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤ 1 (104)
d ≤
d+ x
2
−
1
2
√
(d− x)2 +
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) (105)
1
2ζ
(rs − rd) +
(
x− d
2
−
1
2
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd)
)2
≥ 0 (106)
rd −
αζ
2γn
(x− d)2 ≤ rs < rd (107)
Let us consider inequality (104): √
(d− x)2 +
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ d+ x− 2 . (108)
We have 

(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
d+ x− 2 ≥ 0
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ (d+ x− 2)
2
∪
{
(d− x)2 + 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
d+ x− 2 ≤ 0
(109)
The first system does not admit solution because d, x ∈ [0, 1] while the solution of the second one comes down to
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0 (110)
which hence is the solution of inequality (104).
Let us consider inequality (105), √
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤ x− d , (111)
whose solution is 

x− d ≥ 0
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤ (x− d)
2
⇒
{
x ≥ d
rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2 ≤ rs < rd
(112)
Let us consider inequality (106):
1
2ζ
(rs − rd) +
(
x− d
2
−
1
2
√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd)
)2
≥ 0 . (113)
It can be rewritten as follows
rs − rd
2ζ
+
(x− d)2
4
+
1
4
[
(d− x)2 +
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd)
]
+
−
x− d
2
√
(d− x)2 +
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0 (114)
and, since d < x— by (112) —, we obtain√
(d− x)
2
+
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤ x− d+
(
1
ζ
+
γn
ζα
)
rs − rd
x− d
(115)
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from which 

(d− x)2 + 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≥ 0
x− d+
(
1
ζ
+ γn
ζα
)
rs−rd
x−d ≥ 0
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤
((
1
ζ
+ γn
ζα
)
rs−rd
x−d + (x− d)
)2 (116)
It should be noted that d 6= x because, if we substituted d = x in Eq. (114), we would get (rs − rd)
[
1 + γn
α
]
≥ 0
which does not have solutions for rs < rd.
We can rewrite system (116) in the following way

rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn (x− d)
2
rs ≥ rd −
ζα
α+γn (x− d)
2
(d− x)
2
+ 2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤
((
1
ζ
+ γn
ζα
)
rs−rd
x−d + (x− d)
)2 (117)
For the last inequality we have
2γn
αζ
(rs − rd) ≤
(
1
ζ
+
γn
ζα
)2(
rs − rd
x− d
)2
+ 2
(
1
ζ
+
γn
ζα
)
(rs − rd) (118)
which becomes
0 ≤
(
1
ζ
+
γn
ζα
)2(
rs − rd
x− d
)2
+
2
ζ
(rs − rd) , (119)
whose (acceptable) solution is
rs ≤ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x− d
α+ γn
)2
. (120)
Hence we rewrite system (117) as 

rs ≥ rd −
αζ
2γn(x − d)
2
rs ≥ rd −
ζα
α+γn (x− d)
2
rs ≤ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x−d
α+γn
)2 (121)
Since
rd −
ζα
α+ γn
(x− d)
2
≤ rd −
αζ
2γn
(x − d)2 ≤ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x− d
α+ γn
)2
≤ rd , (122)
for α < γn, and
rd −
αζ
2γn
(x− d)2 ≤ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x− d
α+ γn
)2
≤ rd −
ζα
α+ γn
(x− d)
2
≤ rd , (123)
for α > γn, the solution of system (121) and then of the inequality (106), is empty if α > γn but it equals
rd −
αζ
2γn
(x− d)2 ≤ rs ≤ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x− d
α+ γn
)2
if α < γn (124)
Accordingly, by substituting (110), (112) and (124) into the system (104)-(107) we obtain

d < x
α < γn
rd −
αζ
2γn(x− d)
2 ≤ rs ≤ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x−d
α+γn
)2
rd −
αζ
2γn(x− d)
2 ≤ rs < rd
(125)
which turns into 

d < x
α < γn
rd −
αζ
2γn(x− d)
2 ≤ rs ≤ rd − 2ζα
2
(
x−d
α+γn
)2 (126)
Hence we obtained thesis (38). 
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